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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recently issued
1
decision in Griffis v. Luban arrived among claims of protection for
2
free speech on the Internet, the court missed a significant
† Laura S. Ferster is an attorney with the Labor and Employment Group of
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. J.D., 1998 cum laude,
University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).
2. See Mark A. Cohen, Web Posting Didn’t Give Foreign State Jurisdiction;
Alabama Judgment Can’t Be Enforced in Minnesota, M INNESOTA LAWYER, July 15, 2002,
at 1.
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opportunity to clarify the developing law surrounding Internet
contacts sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. Instead, the court injected additional variables into
established personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Specifically, the
Griffis court imported a new and completely unnecessary personal
jurisdiction test for use in claims involving intentional torts.
The personal jurisdiction test for intentional torts that serves
as the focal point of the Griffis holding was adopted from the Third
3
Circuit’s decision of IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG. As this
article will explain, the adoption of the IMO Industries test appears
to displace existing due process notions and Minnesota authority
4
that would have adequately addressed the issues in Griffis. This
confusing addition to Minnesota’s case law will likely produce more
questions than it answered regarding not only Internet contacts
and personal jurisdiction, but also the status of Minnesota personal
jurisdiction law generally. Therefore, although the supreme court
reached the correct result in Griffis, the decision’s impact and
precedential value are in question.
This article attempts to analyze the reasoning of Griffis and
critiques the court’s adoption of the Third Circuit’s test. Part II
discusses the facts of Griffis; Part III analyzes both the court of
appeals’ and the supreme court’s decisions in Griffis, with emphasis
on the supreme court’s decision and the underlying concepts of
personal jurisdiction that were cited, used, or ignored by the court;
and Part IV illustrates alternative reasoning the Griffis court could
have used in making its decision, and concludes that, for all intents
3. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535 (adopting the test articulated in IMO Industries.
Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998), which ostensibly crafts and
applies a modified version of the effects test derived in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984)).
4. In Minnesota, the fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant has been determined by applying a five-factor test. See, e.g.
M.G. Incentives, Inc. v. J.J. Marchand, 2001 WL 96223, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001). Under this test, the court examines the following factors: “(1) the quantity
of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quality and nature of the contacts; (3)
the connection between the cause of action and the contacts; (4) the state’s
interest in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience to the parties.” Id. (citing
KSTP-FM, LLC v. Specialized Communications, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999)); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn.
1978). This test summarizes significant personal jurisdiction principles into a
cohesive approach ensuring uniform application of due process protections. See
also Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn. 1992)
(analyzing similar factors in holding that minimum contacts were sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction).
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and purposes, Griffis is—or should be—limited to its exceptionally
unique procedural posture.
II. GRIFFIS: FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
In Griffis v. Luban, a Minnesota resident (“Luban”) was sued in
an Alabama court by an Alabama resident (“Griffis”) for
5
defamation and invasion of privacy. Luban and Griffis had both
participated in an Internet newsgroup that was organized around
6
the topic of archeology. Luban maintained a non-professional
interest in the history and culture of ancient Egypt. Griffis taught
noncredit courses in ancient Egyptian history and culture at the
University of Alabama and also worked as a self-employed
7
consultant. Through their postings to the newsgroup, a
disagreement between Luban and Griffis arose on the subject of
8
Egypt and Egyptology.
In the course of their on-line
disagreement, Luban posted challenges to Griffis’ professional
9
credentials on the newsgroup website. After filing her defamation
suit, Griffis obtained a default judgment in an Alabama court
against Luban, who had been advised by counsel not to answer the
10
Alabama complaint. Thereafter, Griffis sought enforcement of
11
the judgment in Minnesota.
Under Minnesota law, a defendant has the right to contest an
action based on a foreign court’s judgment by demonstrating “that
the foreign court rendered the judgment in the absence of
12
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Such judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit in
Minnesota. Minnesota courts will uphold a foreign
5. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d. at 528.
6. Id. at 530 (explaining that an Internet newsgroup is a “forum for Internet
users that addresses a specific topic and allows participants to exchange
information and engage in discussions or debate by ‘posting’ messages on the
website” and noting that the newsgroup could be “accessed anywhere by any
person with Internet access”).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 531 (citing David M. Rice, Inc. v. Intrex, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 370, 372
(Minn. 1977)).
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court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant when two requirements are met:
(1) compliance with the foreign state’s law providing
jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction under
circumstances that do not offend13 the Due Process Clause
of the federal constitution [sic].
The district court found that Alabama’s long-arm statute permitted
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Luban and that such
14
jurisdiction complied with the Due Process Clause. Therefore,
the Minnesota district court found that Alabama had personal
jurisdiction over Luban and thus its judgment should be afforded
15
full faith and credit.
B. Griffis in the Minnesota Court of Appeals
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s
decision, also concluding that the Alabama court properly
16
exercised personal jurisdiction over Luban. The court of appeals
analyzed Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law, which differs from
Minnesota’s long-arm statute in that it does not contain a special
exclusion for defamation and privacy claims, and applies principles
17
of due process to the full extent allowed under the Constitution.
13. Id. (citing Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Acts, M INN. STAT.
§ 548.27 (2000); Hutson v. Christensen, 295 Minn. 112, 117, 203 N.W.2d 535, 538
(1972); Intrex, 257 N.W.2d at 372).
14. Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 551-52 (noting that in contrast to Minnesota’s long-arm statute,
Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law contains no exclusions for claims of
defamation); see M INN. STAT. § 543.19 subd. 1 (2001).
As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this
subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject
matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign
corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual’s
personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a
domestic corporation or the individual were a resident of this
state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the
foreign corporation or nonresident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property
situated in this state, or
(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property
damage, or
(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property
damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no
jurisdiction shall be found:
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In its decision, the court of appeals adopted the reasoning of a
18
United States Supreme Court case, Calder v. Jones, which held that
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants for purposes of
intentional torts may be exercised where the “effects of their
19
intentional conduct were felt in the forum state.” The court of
appeals, relying on Calder, found that Luban “should have foreseen
that she might be sued in Alabama because she had actual
knowledge of the effect that her messages were having in
20
Alabama.”
The court of appeals viewed Luban’s postings as
sufficient contact with the state of Alabama because she made the
postings “even after she was threatened with legal action” by Griffis’
21
lawyer. The court also expressly found that (1) the messages
could have been and were received in Alabama; (2) Luban was
aware her messages would be read in a foreign state; and (3) Luban
22
was aware her messages were causing damage in Alabama. Thus,
the court of appeals held, “[Luban] should have realized that by
making potentially defamatory statements that were being read in
Alabama, she could be haled into court in Alabama to prove the
23
truth of those statements.”
C. Griffis in the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
holding that the Alabama court did not have personal jurisdiction
(1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum;
or
(2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought
under the state’s jurisdiction would violate fairness and
substantial justice; or
(3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
19. Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 787 n.6); see IMO
Indus. Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d. Cir. 1998) (citing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)) (stating that Calder essentially examined the following
three factors to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed: (1) whether the
defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) whether the plaintiff felt the brunt
of the harm caused by that tort in the forum such that the forum state was the
focal point of the plaintiff’s injury; and (3) whether the defendant expressly aimed
the tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum state was the focal point of
the tortious activity).
20. Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 552-53.
21. Id. at 553.
22. Id.
23. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 15
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC

348

10/28/2002 10:47 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2
24

over Luban when it rendered its default judgment. Like the court
of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court, analyzed Alabama’s
personal jurisdiction law by applying the principles of due process
25
to the full extent allowed under the Constitution.
After
articulating the basic, long-standing principles of personal
jurisdiction, the Griffis court went on to focus on two specific
26
federal cases—Calder and IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG.
Importantly, the IMO Industries test is essentially a repackaging of
27
the Calder test. Thus, both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and
the Minnesota Supreme Court essentially relied on the same case—
Calder v. Jones—yet reached different conclusions. Specifically, the
Minnesota Supreme Court found, inter alia, that Luban’s postings
to the Internet newsgroup were not sufficient to show that she
28
knew Griffis would suffer harm in Alabama. Therefore, the
29
Alabama judgment was not enforceable in Minnesota.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GRIFFIS HOLDING
A. “Sound Bites” of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Griffis cites several
well-known United States Supreme Court decisions in articulating
30
the due process standards of personal jurisdiction. However, the
24. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536-37 (Minn. 2002).
25. Id.
26. 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998).
27. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258 (3rd. Cir. 2001) (analyzing how
the court in IMO Indus. applied the three-prong effects test of Calder); Christopher
Allen Kroblin, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach for Intentional Torts:
Implications for Cyber Contacts, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 72-75 (2001)
(describing the court’s analysis in IMO Indus. as systematically applying the factors
developed in Calder’s effects test, specifically focusing on the express aiming
requirement); Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice Lost in Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory
Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 330 (2001) (quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at
265) (describing IMO’s use of the effects test and concluding that the defendant
must “manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on [the forum]” for
Calder to be satisfied).
28. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 536-37.
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id. at 532 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
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Griffis decision merely cites the key language from these cases while
ignoring the principles they established. A brief review of these
decisions is therefore appropriate.
The Griffis decision first cites the 1945 seminal case of
31
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a shoe company with sales persons
operating in a local forum had sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state such that maintenance of a suit for contribution to
the state’s unemployment compensation fund did not offend
32
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The
Court recognized the shift from a strictly geographical basis to a
procedural due process basis for personal jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him . . . . But
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
33
justice.
International Shoe was responsible for articulating the bedrock
principles of modern day personal jurisdiction analysis. It infused
the analysis with the notion that due process must be measured by
the “quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws that it was the purpose of the
34
Due Process Clause to insure [sic].” The Court in International
Shoe further stated that the Due Process Clause does not “make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate
35
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”
Thus, early cases recognized the need for flexible standards of
personal jurisdiction that protected due process and notice rights
U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. Id. at 316 (internal citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 319.
35. Id.
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of potential defendants.
36
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall is cited by the
Griffis court in its analysis of personal jurisdiction for the following
proposition: “In judging minimum contacts for purposes of
assessing the validity of specific jurisdiction, a court focuses on the
‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
37
litigation.’” In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death
38
action in Texas against a Colombian corporation. The United
States Supreme Court analyzed the defendant’s contacts with the
39
forum state under the rubric of “general jurisdiction” since the
parties had agreed that the dispute did not “arise out of” and was
40
“not related to” the defendant’s activities within the forum. The
Court held that the defendant did not have sufficient contacts with
41
Texas for general jurisdiction. While Helicopteros is meaningful to
distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction, its
application does not advance the analysis of specific personal
jurisdiction at issue in Griffis.
42
Griffis cites Hanson v. Denckla, stating that “[f]or the
minimum contacts requirement to be satisfied, the defendant must
have ‘purposefully avail[ed]’ herself of the privilege of conducting
43
activities within the forum State . . . .” In Hanson v. Denckla, the
Supreme Court decided that a Florida state court did not have
personal jurisdiction over an indispensable Delaware party, a
trustee for a decedent’s Delaware trust, in a controversy involving
44
rights to the Delaware trust.
The decedent in Hanson had
36. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
37. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414-15).
38. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410.
39. Id. at 414-15 (explaining that general jurisdiction involves the exercise of
jurisdiction over a non-resident where, although the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the nonresident’s activities in the forum, there are otherwise
sufficient contacts between the state and the nonresident) (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 415.
41. Id. at 411, 416 (Defendant’s contacts were as follows: it had purchased
80% of its helicopter fleet, spare parts, and accessories in excess of $4 million from
a company in Texas; it sent prospective pilots to Texas for training and to ferry the
aircraft to South America; it sent management and maintenance personnel to visit
its helicopter supplier in Texas to become familiar with the plant and for technical
consultation; and it received into its New York City and Panama City, Florida bank
accounts over $5 million in payments drawn from a Texas bank.).
42. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting and
modifying Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
44. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.
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established the trust in Delaware before moving to Florida where
45
she became a resident. The Hanson Court decided that the
Delaware court properly refused to enforce a Florida judgment,
46
thus denying the judgment full faith and credit in Delaware. The
Hanson Court cited International Shoe for the proposition that “it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
47
protection of its laws.” The Court found that the Delaware trustee
did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida where the
only connection with the forum resulted from decedent’s decision
48
to exercise her power of appointment there. The trust company
at issue had no office in Florida, neither held nor administered any
49
business assets in Florida, and solicited no business there. The
Court explained that the unilateral activity of the party asserting
the existence of a relationship does not provide the requisite
contact with the state necessary for personal jurisdiction and that
the “suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that
50
arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida.” Under
these circumstances, the Court was unwilling to find personal
jurisdiction over the Delaware resident.
51
Griffis also cites World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson for the
often stated proposition: “[t]he defendant’s conduct and
connections with the forum state must be such that the defendant
52
‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the individual plaintiffs, residents of New
York, sued the defendant, a New York corporation, in Oklahoma
for injuries sustained in Oklahoma from an accident in an
53
automobile that had been purchased in New York. The accident
54
occurred while the plaintiffs were driving through Oklahoma. In
concluding that the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over
the defendant, the Court determined that the defendant carried
45. Id.
46. Id. at 254-55.
47. Id. at 253.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 251.
50. Id. at 252-53.
51. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
52. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
53. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
54. Id.
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on no activity in Oklahoma, made no direct sales, and provided no
services there. Thus, the Court held, the defendant did not avail
55
itself of the privileges or benefits of Oklahoma’s laws. In so
finding, the Supreme Court discussed the transformation of the
American economy and the relaxation of the limits imposed by the
Due Process Clause, but stated that “[n]evertheless, we have never
accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the
56
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”
The Court held that where an individual or corporate defendant
has no contacts, ties, or relations with the state, personal
57
jurisdiction will not be found. The Court stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the
tribunals of another state; even if the forum State has
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even
if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to58 divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court refused to base jurisdiction
on the isolated occurrence of the accident in Oklahoma and
rejected the argument that the inherent mobility of the automobile
made it foreseeable that the vehicle at issue would cause injury in
59
Oklahoma.
As to foreseeability, the Court stated “[t]he
foreseeability that is critical to the due process analysis” is “the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
60
there.” The Court further stated that “the Due Process Clause, by
ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
61
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”

55. Id. at 295.
56. Id. at 293 (attributing this transformation of the American economy to
the advancement of technology and the nationalization of commerce through the
increased use of phone lines and travel).
57. Id. at 294.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 295.
60. Id. at 297.
61. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/15

10

Ferster: Griffis v. Luban: A Red Herring in the High Seas of Personal Juri
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC

2002]

GRIFFIS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

10/28/2002 10:47 PM

353

Given the defendant’s lack of purposeful activities, the Court held
it could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
62
Oklahoma.
The Griffis court, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, noted
that “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that specific jurisdiction
may be found where the nonresident defendant has ‘purposefully
directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation
results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those
63
activities.’” In Burger King, a Florida franchiser brought an action
in Florida for breach of contract and trademark infringement
64
against a Michigan resident and franchisee. The Court held that
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Florida was proper even
65
though the defendant had no physical presence in the forum.
The Court held that personal jurisdiction existed where the
defendant “deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and
negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a longterm franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from
66
affiliation with a nationwide organization.”
The Court
emphasized that the defendant entered into a highly structured,
twenty-year relationship that “envisioned continuing and wide67
reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida.” The Court stated
that the “purposeful availment requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral
68
activity of another party or a third person.” The Court stated that
“[j]urisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial
69
connection with the forum State.”
The Court explained as
follows:
[W]here the defendant deliberately has engaged in
62. Id. at 295.
63. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
64. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985).
65. Id. at 476 (stating that “so long as a commercial actor’s efforts are
purposefully directed toward residents of another State, we have consistently
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there”) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 479-80 (internal quotation omitted).
67. Id. at 480 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
68. Id. at 475 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
69. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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significant activities within a State, or has created
continuing obligations between himself and the residents
of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting business there, and because his
activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of
the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to
require him70 to submit to the burdens of litigation in that
forum . . . .
Although it found that the Michigan defendant was subject to
the jurisdiction of the Florida courts, the Court in Burger King made
clear that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum
with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or
71
relations.” Where such a connection is absent, the defendant has
“no clear notice that it is subject to suit in the forum and thus no
72
opportunity to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation there.”
The Court went on to state that “even a single act can support
jurisdiction” where a “substantial connection” with the forum is
73
created thereby. However, on this point, the Court was quick to
explain:
The Court has noted, however, that some single or
occasional acts related to the forum may not be sufficient
to establish jurisdiction if their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission create only an
attenuated affiliation with the forum. This distinction
derives from the belief that, with respect to this category
of isolated acts, the reasonable foreseeability
of litigation
74
in the forum is substantially diminished.
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions summarized
above reflect flexibility in applying traditional personal jurisdiction
concepts to a variety of circumstances. The Court’s decision in
Burger King is especially significant because it was decided after
Calder v. Jones, the case responsible for the two completely different
results reached by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the
75
Minnesota Supreme Court in the Griffis case.
The Court’s
70. Id. at 475-76 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
71. Id. at 471-72 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
72. Id. at 476 n.17 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
73. Id. at 476 n.18 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
74. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
75. See Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534-35 (Minn. 2002) (recognizing
the significance that Burger King was decided after Calder but adopting the threepart IMO Industries test in any event).
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decision in Burger King contains an amalgam of personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence and articulates the fluid concepts in an
extremely useful manner. Thus, as will be explained in Part IV A,
Burger King provided a much better framework for analyzing and
76
deciding Griffis than did the cases of Calder and IMO Industries.
B. The Quagmire of Calder and IMO Industries
1. The Facts of Calder
In Calder, California resident and entertainer Shirley Jones
sued Florida residents in California over an allegedly libelous
National Enquirer article, written and edited by two of the
77
defendants, concerning her California activities. Although the
National Enquirer was distributed nationally, it had its largest
78
circulation in California. Plaintiff’s profession as an entertainer
79
was centered in California. The reporter and the editor, the
individual defendants, moved to quash service of process for lack of
80
personal jurisdiction. Although one defendant’s contacts with
California, which included a visit and several phone calls, were
alleged as a basis for jurisdiction, the Court found it unnecessary to
81
consider those direct contacts with the forum. Instead, the Court
held that California had personal jurisdiction over the reporter and
editor because their Florida-based conduct was “expressly aimed” at
California, knowing that the “brunt” of the harmful “effects” would
82
be felt primarily there. This reasoning has become known by
83
courts as the “effects test.” The Court emphasized that the alleged
84
tort was not “mere untargeted negligence.”
Under these
circumstances, the defendants “must ‘reasonably anticipate being
85
haled into court’” in California for their out-of-state actions.
It is important to recognize that Calder is somewhat of an
anomaly in Supreme Court personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, as
76. See infra Part IV.A.
77. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1984).
78. Id. at 785.
79. Id. at 788.
80. Id. at 784-85.
81. Id. at 787 n.6.
82. Id. at 789-90.
83. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998).
84. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
85. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 15
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC

356

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

10/28/2002 10:47 PM

[Vol. 29:2

that decision has resulted in a myriad of different interpretations
86
and applications in state and federal courts across the country. By
approving the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual
defendants based on the “effects” of their intentionally tortious
conduct in the forum state, Calder has such potentially broad
application that it could render any jurisdictional boundaries nonexistent and effectively nullify a long line of precedent establishing
87
the limits of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
The results in Calder were properly mitigated by the
subsequent decision of Burger King, which, as the Griffis court
noted, makes clear “that the foreseeability of effects in the forum is
88
not itself enough to justify long-arm jurisdiction.” On this point,
the Griffis court quoted Burger King as follows:
[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in
the forum State. Although it has been argued that
foreseeability of causing [injury] in another State should
be sufficient to establish such contacts there when policy
considerations so require, the Court has consistently held
that this kind of foreseeability is not a sufficient
benchmark for exercising personal jurisdiction. Instead,
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the
forum State such are that he should
reasonably anticipate
89
being haled into court there.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s explicit recognition of this aspect
of Burger King makes its decision to import the Calder concepts even
more baffling. Perhaps, as the Burger King decision suggests, public
policy considerations were at play in Calder where the courts were
86. See, e.g., Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 533 (discussing several cases and stating
that courts “have come to varying conclusions about how broadly the ‘effects test’
approved in Calder can be applied to find jurisdiction”). See also, e.g., Donald I.
Baker et al., Defendants Motion to Dismiss Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
Support Thereof, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1079-80 (2000); Christine G. Heslinga,
The Founders Go On-Line: An Original Intent Solution to a Jurisdictional Dilemma, 9 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 247, 261-62 (2000); Shelby R. Quast, International Legal
Developments in Law Review 1998, 33 INT’ L LAW 429, 431-32 (1999).
87. See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: The First Amendment in an On-Line World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1167 (1996)
(discussing the potential breadth of Calder and Keeton in establishing jurisdiction
over users and operators of Internet bulletin board systems).
88. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534.
89. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985))
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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coping with the tabloid press, which possibly reflected a public
disdain for such press at that time. In any event, despite its obvious
recognition that it was not necessary to incorporate the Calder
90
principles into its personal jurisdiction analysis, the Griffis decision
91
has adopted a test that is entirely premised on Calder’s effects test.
It is not clear why the Minnesota courts chose Griffis, an anomalous
case itself, to adopt such reasoning.
2. IMO Industries—The Third Circuit’s Approach to Calder
In its decision in Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that Calder has produced a variety of reactions from a multitude of
92
jurisdictions.
The Griffis court identified the Third Circuit’s
approach to Calder in IMO Industries as “the most cogent analysis of
93
the Calder effects test.”
In IMO Industries, a New Jersey
multinational corporation sued a German corporation in a New
Jersey court for the intentional tort of interfering with the
plaintiff’s attempt to sell its wholly-owned Italian subsidiary to a
94
French corporation that was one of the defendant’s competitors.
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of
95
personal jurisdiction.
In deciding that New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, the Third Circuit expressly stated that because the
issue involved an intentional tort, it was required to consider Calder
96
in making its decision. The court expressed concern, however,

90. See, e.g., M.G. Incentives, Inc. v. J.J. Marchand, 2001 WL 96223 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction existed over defendant for claims
including breach of contract, conversion, and fraud); Humphrey v. Granite Gate
Resorts, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d without comment by 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (finding personal jurisdiction existed over defendant
for claims of deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud);
Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
personal jurisdiction over non-resident father existed for purposes of order for
protection due to child’s suffering effects of abuse in Minnesota); Olson v.
Magnuson, 457 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (using a five-factor test for
determining whether adequate minimum contacts exist to exercise personal
jurisdiction to conclude that the court has jurisdiction over evangelical churches
in action alleging sexual abuse of children).
91. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 532-37.
92. Id. at 533.
93. Id. at 534.
94. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 268.
96. Id. at 259-60.
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over the possible breadth of the Calder decision. The Third
Circuit took issue with the inference drawn from Calder that an outof-state defendant can anticipate being haled into the forum
because the defendant knew that the plaintiff resided in the
98
forum. The Third Circuit concluded that the Calder effects test is
not satisfied by the “mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the
effect of the defendant’s tortious conduct in the forum [simply]
99
because the plaintiff is located there.” Significantly, the Third
Circuit stated that in Calder, the Supreme Court did not “carve out
a special intentional torts exception to the traditional specific
jurisdiction analysis so that a plaintiff could always sue in his or her
100
home state,” and that “Calder’s holding cannot be severed from its
101
facts.”
Notwithstanding its own recognition that Calder did not
establish a separate and distinct personal jurisdiction analysis for
claims of intentional torts and that Calder was severely limited to its
facts, the Third Circuit nonetheless fashioned the following threepart test for personal jurisdiction based on Calder for use in cases
involving intentional torts:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such
that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the
harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that tort; and
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the
forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal
102
point of the activity.
Even though the court in IMO Industries proclaimed that its threepart test mitigated the overly broad potential of the Calder effects
test, in actuality, the elements of the test appear to simply interpret
103
the holding of Calder. Thus, the Griffis court’s decision to adopt
97. Id. at 262-63.
98. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534 (paraphrasing the Third Circuit’s concern
about the breadth of the Calder test).
99. IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 263.
100. Id. at 265.
101. Id. at 261.
102. Id. at 265.
103. See Christopher Allen Kroblin, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach for
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the IMO Industries test will do little to protect litigants from the
overbroad concepts of personal jurisdiction articulated in Calder.
The focus of the IMO Industries test is the third-prong—the
104
“expressly aimed” portion of the test.
If it is found that the
defendant “expressly aimed” its tortious conduct at the forum, then
the need to consider whether the brunt of the harm was actually
105
suffered by the plaintiff in the forum arises. In order for a court
to make the “expressly aimed” determination, the plaintiff “must
show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the
brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum,
and point to specific activity indicating that the defendant expressly
106
aimed its tortious conduct at the forum.” The resulting analysis
required by this prong of the test would arguably involve extensive
fact finding regarding intricate details of the case, including
causation, the subjective knowledge of a defendant, and the
potential need to determine the intent of the defendant when it
“aimed” a tortious act at the forum. Indeed, the first part of the
test—whether the defendant committed an intentional tort—
appears to require that a fact determination be made by the court
at the threshold juncture of jurisdictional disputes. Applying this
three-prong test, the court concluded that the plaintiff was unable
to demonstrate the requisite conduct indicating that the defendant
107
“expressly aimed” its tortious conduct at New Jersey.
3. The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts the IMO Industries
Three-Part Personal Jurisdiction Test
The Griffis court, in adopting the Third Circuit’s three-part
test, expressly shared the Third Circuit’s concern over the breadth
108
of the potential application of Calder. Similarly, the Griffis court
Intentional Torts: Implications for Cyber Contacts, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 81-82
(2001) (recognizing that three elements must be met for the Calder effects test to
be satisfied: (1) an intentional act; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3)
causing harm that the defendant knows the brunt of which will be felt in the
forum state); Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice Lost in Cyber-Space: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory
Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2001) (listing similar three-part Calder
test).
104. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 268.
108. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2002). See also supra notes
90-94 and accompanying text.
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agreed with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the Supreme Court
did not create an exception to the personal jurisdiction analysis for
109
intentional torts.
Still, the Griffis decision adopted the Third
Circuit’s test along with its inconsistent reasoning, thus
perpetuating the notion that Calder must be applied under
110
circumstances involving intentional torts.
In Griffis, the court applied the Third Circuit’s three-part test
and analyzed the facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim of personal
111
jurisdiction.
Like the IMO Industries court, the court in Griffis
focused on whether the defendant “expressly aimed the allegedly
tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum was the focal
112
point of the tortious activity.”
In determining whether the
defendant “knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the
harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum,” the court
reviewed the record for any indication that Luban “expressly aimed
113
[her] tortious conduct at the forum.” The plaintiff had argued
that the following facts provided a basis for jurisdiction: (1) Luban
directed her defamatory statements at the Alabama forum because
she targeted her messages at the plaintiff, whom Luban knew to be
an Alabama resident; (2) Luban knew that the messages posted to
the archeology newsgroup could be read anywhere in the world
and that, in fact, they were read by the plaintiff in Alabama; and (3)
that Luban’s statements had “deleterious effects” on plaintiff’s
114
business and reputation.
Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the Griffis court found that
115
Luban did not expressly aim the statements at Alabama. Instead,
the court found that Luban “intentionally directed [her
statements] at Griffis, whom she knew to be an Alabama
116
resident . . . .” In so finding, the court noted that the statements
were not “targeted at the state of Alabama or at an Alabama
117
audience beyond Griffis herself.” Interestingly, it is difficult to
understand how this aspect of the test is much different from

109. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 535-36.
114. Id. at 535.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (stating that the other two prongs of the effects test need not be
addressed because all three prongs must be satisfied for jurisdiction to attach).
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purposeful availment concepts discussed earlier in connection with
existing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Although Griffis
argued that the newsgroup to which Luban posted her messages
118
was “widely read by her colleagues,” the court found that the
record contained no evidence that “any other person in Alabama
119
read the statements.”
Ironically, the court also noted that Griffis had not asserted
that “Alabama has a unique relationship with the field of
Egyptology, like the close relationship between the plaintiff’s
profession and the forum state that the Supreme Court found
120
relevant in Calder.” The court’s acknowledgment of this unique
aspect of Calder serves to highlight its incongruous decision to
incorporate Calder into Minnesota personal jurisdiction law,
particularly under the anomalous facts of this case. The court went
on to conclude that “the fact that messages posted to the
newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have
been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice to establish
121
Alabama as the focal point of the defendant’s conduct.”
The Griffis court’s findings are consistent with long-standing
principles of minimum contacts and purposeful availment, as
discussed in Part IV A, making the adoption of the Third Circuit’s
three-part test wholly unnecessary. In addition, the Griffis court
engaged in evaluating whether the allegedly defamatory statements
harmed Griffis. The court found no support in the record for the
assertion that “Luban’s messages were read by any other person in
Alabama, or by anyone in the academic community at the
University of Alabama” and concluded that Griffis had not been
122
harmed. In so concluding, the court effectively decided that an
123
essential element of defamation was lacking—that of publication.
As a result, the three-part test adopted by the Griffis court has the
potential to encourage future courts to make personal jurisdiction
decisions by deciding underlying substantive claims, a posture that
has heretofore been wholly unnecessary in personal jurisdiction
118. Id. at 536.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d, 590, 594 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000) (“For a statement to meet the legal standards for defamation, ‘it must
be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff.’”) (quoting Stuempges v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980)).
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analyses.
Given that the Griffis court had ample personal jurisdiction
authority at its disposal, the court should not have adopted IMO
Industries’ questionable three-part test. It is unclear whether the
supreme court intends this test to displace existing Minnesota
personal jurisdiction authority in all cases, in cases involving
intentional torts, or only in cases involving enforcement of foreign
judgments. As a consequence, the Griffis decision is at odds with
the primary purposes of the Due Process Clause: notice and
predictability of the legal system, which allows potential defendants
to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
124
suit.
As discussed next, the Calder/IMO Industries debacle
apparent in Griffis could have been avoided by applying existing,
long-standing judicial authority to determine that the Alabama
court did not have personal jurisdiction over Luban.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF GRIFFIS
This section illustrates of the following concepts: (A) Griffis
could have been decided using existing principles of personal
jurisdiction, obviating any need to resort to the adoption of the
IMO Industries test; (B) persuasive authority from federal circuit
courts provide a more useful and reasonable framework for
analyzing Calder and IMO Industries; (C) in light of Minnesota
statutes and case law, the application of Griffis to cases arising
under Minnesota law should be strictly limited to its facts; and (D)
existing Minnesota authority may be relied on in cases involving
issues of personal jurisdiction, intentional torts, and Internet
contacts, further demonstrating the limited practical applicability
of Griffis to cases arising under substantive Minnesota law.
A. Deciding Griffis Using Existing Personal Jurisdiction Principles
In finding that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, the Griffis court found that (1) the defendant
did not expressly aim the statements in question at Alabama; (2)
the target and only recipient of the statements was the plaintiff
herself, not the state of Alabama or a larger Alabama audience; and
124.

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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(3) the defendant posted messages to an Internet newsgroup that
125
could have been read in Alabama or anywhere else in the world.
In evaluating the quality and nature of Luban’s activities, Griffis’
claims do not articulate any connection between Luban and
Alabama in which Luban purposefully availed herself of the
126
privilege of conducting activities within the jurisdiction. Luban’s
activities occurred within the context of an Internet newsgroup to
127
which members from all over the globe had access. The purpose
of the newsgroup is to share ideas about a particular subject—
Egyptology—which does not implicate Luban in taking advantage
of any of the laws or protections of Alabama. Luban similarly did
128
not direct her activities toward the state of Alabama. Rather, her
activities were directed toward the newsgroup—an amorphous
location—and at Griffis herself. Like the plaintiffs in World Wide
Volkswagen, the chance “meeting” of Luban and Griffis via the
newsgroup and the subsequent disagreement that occurred in the
context of postings to the newsgroup website did not make it
foreseeable that injury to Griffis would occur in Alabama. Indeed,
any conduct and connection between Luban and Alabama was
patently absent in this case. Such connection is critical to the due
process analysis. Such an attenuated, chance, and isolated
connection does not provide a basis to conclude that Luban was on
129
notice that she may be sued in Alabama.
This lack of notice
prevented Luban from structuring her conduct to avoid suit in
Alabama. Given this lack of purposeful activity directed at the
forum, Luban could not reasonably have anticipated being haled
130
into court there.
In addition, the fact that Luban directed her activities at a
resident of the forum does not, in and of itself, give rise to personal
131
jurisdiction in this case.
As the Court in Burger King stated, in
order for a non-resident to be liable in the forum state for injuries
that were proximately caused by the defendant’s activity, the
defendant must have “engaged in significant activities within a state
125. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535-36 (Minn. 2002).
126. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
127. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 530.
128. Id. at 535.
129. Id. at 536-37.
130. Id.
131. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (stating that
the defendant must also have fair warning that an activity will subject them to
foreign jurisdiction).
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or [have] created continuing obligations between himself and the
132
residents of the forum.”
Here, Luban’s activities—statements
made in the context of the newsgroup website—do not create
substantial connections with Alabama or continuing obligations
between herself and Griffis. Unlike the defendant in Burger King,
Luban neither reached out to Griffis for any specific reason related
to her residence in Alabama; nor cultivated a relationship with
Griffis that necessitated continuing contact with either Griffis or
Alabama. Luban’s activity involved communications with Griffis
and other users of the newsgroup, which pertained to a topic of
133
study and conversation.
Within that context, differences of
opinion apparently occurred. Subsequent statements made by
Luban grew out of these differences of opinion. The knowledge of
the fact that the postings could have been received in Alabama, or
anywhere else in the world for that matter, lacks the type of
foreseeability sufficient to put the defendant on notice of being
134
haled into court in the forum.
Further, while in some circumstances “even a single act can
support jurisdiction,” Luban’s conduct did not create the requisite
135
substantial connection with Alabama.
Any connection or
affiliation with Alabama arising from Luban’s conduct was
136
“attenuated” at best. Consequently, the foreseeability of litigation
in Alabama based on the isolated nature of Luban’s actions was
137
substantially diminished. Thus, the Alabama court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Luban when it rendered its default
judgment and, therefore, the Alabama judgment should not be
entitled to full faith and credit in Minnesota.
The above analysis is only one example of how existing
authority and concepts could have been used to reach the same
result the Griffis court reached without the adoption of a new
personal jurisdiction test. There may be some benefit to an
enhanced personal jurisdiction analysis for certain types of claims
132. Id. at 476 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
133. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 530.
134. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”)).
135. See id. at 476 n.18.
136. See id. at 475-76.
137. See id. (stating that an isolated act usually diminishes the reasonable
foreseeability of litigation in the forum).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/15

22

Ferster: Griffis v. Luban: A Red Herring in the High Seas of Personal Juri
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC

2002]

GRIFFIS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

10/28/2002 10:47 PM

365

where public policy considerations are required. Nevertheless,
without providing more guidance, the Minnesota Supreme Court
should have ignored the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Calder
and decided the case on the particular facts using long-standing
personal jurisdiction authority and principles. This is especially so
for two reasons: (1) the claims at issue in Griffis arose in the unique
posture of the attempted Minnesota enforcement of the default
Alabama judgment; and (2) the same claims under Minnesota law,
as discussed next, would have been decided in an entirely different
manner.
B. Other Persuasive Authority Interpreting Calder
A recent case from the federal district court in Minnesota
demonstrates that other avenues were open to the Griffis court in
interpreting and applying Calder. In Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning,
LLC, the plaintiff sued a corporate defendant and an individual
138
defendant for copyright infringement. The defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court dismissed,
without prejudice, claims against the individual defendant, but
139
allowed the action to proceed against the corporate defendant.
The court held that the individual defendant’s activities, which
consisted of attending a one-day conference in Minnesota and
giving a speech that was generally related to the topic of the
copyright infringement allegations, did not relate to or arise from
the plaintiff’s claims. Thus the court held, it could not exercise
140
personal jurisdiction over her.
The plaintiff had argued,
however, that the defendant’s conduct should be subjected to the
Calder effects test because the defendants intentionally infringed on
141
the copyright of a Minnesota resident.
In determining that the Calder effects test did not apply to the
individual defendant, the court cited a number of federal circuit
142
court cases. First, the court prefaced its analysis by stating that
“the mere fact that [the plaintiff] has alleged that Defendants
committed an intentional tort against her . . . does not necessarily
143
justify haling them in to a Minnesota Court.” It then stated that
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

2002 WL 31053211 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2002).
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4 (quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 262, and citing Hicklin Eng’g
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“[a]lthough courts ‘have struggled somewhat with Calder’s import’
it is clear that the effects test does not entirely supplant minimum
144
contacts analysis.”
In declining to apply the Calder effects test to the individual
defendant, the court found that “[n]either the allegedly infringing
materials in this case nor the harm from those materials is
145
exclusively or primarily centered in this forum.” Thus, it appears
that since there were no underlying contacts between the forum
and the individual defendant, the court refused to exercise
personal jurisdiction over her. On the other hand, the court relied
on the Calder effects test and the plaintiff’s allegations to bolster its
findings that the corporate defendant had purposefully directed its
activities at Minnesota such that personal jurisdiction over that
146
defendant was proper.
Given the plethora of existing persuasive authority
interpreting the Calder effects test in a more thorough and
reasonable manner—as demonstrated by the Mulcahy court—it is
unclear why the Griffis court proceeded to adopt the IMO Industries
court’s three-part test, especially with no further guidance as to its
future applicability.
C. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday: No Personal Jurisdiction in
Minnesota over Claims of Defamation and Privacy via the Internet
147

In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that alleged defamatory contacts of a Washington
State resident, made via e-mail to various locations in Minnesota,
did not subject the Washington resident to personal jurisdiction in

Inc. v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Swiss Am.
Bank Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623 (1st Cir. 2001); Panda Bradywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001); Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d
1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985)).
144. Id. at *5 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087, and discussing
Dakota Indus. Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946, F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir.
1991); Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 624; Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278,
286-87 (5th Cir. 1997)).
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id. at *5. Cf. Raymedica, Inc. v. Vladimir Stoy, 2002 WL 31185916 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2002). There, the court held that the effects test is an alternative
and equal basis of jurisdiction. Even absent a finding of minimum contacts, the
court held that satisfaction of the effects test was enough to confer jurisdiction. Id.
at *4-5.
147. 617 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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148

Minnesota.
In that case, the plaintiff, Northwest Airlines, Inc.
(“Northwest”), sued Washington resident Louise Friday (“Friday”)
for defamation and business disparagement in Minnesota. The
defendant and her husband, Craig Friday, had previously sued
Northwest in Washington for claims in connection with Mr.
149
Friday’s employment. Defendant Friday sent out a press release
by e-mail from Washington that repeated many of the lawsuit’s
150
allegations and attached an electronic copy of the complaint. In
response, Northwest sued Friday for defamation and business
151
disparagement.
Friday disputed that the Minnesota court had
152
personal jurisdiction over her.
The chief distinction between
Friday and Griffis is that Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law differs
significantly from Minnesota’s long-arm statute with regard to
153
claims of defamation and privacy. It is important to understand
this difference between the two cases because it severely limits the
applicability of Griffis to future personal jurisdiction cases arising
under Minnesota defamation and privacy law.
Northwest alleged in its complaint that the “press release was
issued in Minnesota and elsewhere,” and that it was “picked up by
154
newspapers that are published in the Twin Cities.”
Friday
admitted that the “e-mail was addressed to individuals in various
cities throughout the country, and one or more of the addressees
155
were located in Minnesota.” However, she also averred that she
owned no property in Minnesota, transacted no business in
Minnesota, was not employed in Minnesota, and had only been in
156
The
Minnesota once, to change planes, in the last few years.
district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction
157
relying on Minnesota’s long-arm statute.
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal, noting that
148. Id. at 592.
149. Id. (stating that the allegations contained in the Washington complaint
included whistleblower retaliation, humiliation, defamation, emotional distress,
ADA violations, harassment, and allegations that Craig Friday was fit to fly, and
that Northwest’s actions to the contrary were taken in retaliation for his numerous
complaints about Northwest’s unsafe practices).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
154. Northwest Airlines, 617 N.W.2d at 592.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 596.
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“although both state and federal law must be satisfied, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the long-arm statute in
such a way that ‘when analyzing most personal jurisdiction
questions, Minnesota courts may simply apply the federal case law’
158
on minimum contacts.”
However, the Friday case involved an
exception to that general rule “requiring [the court] to interpret a
159
little-used provision in [Minnesota’s] long-arm statute.”
Minnesota’s long-arm statute provides that Minnesota courts do not
have jurisdiction over nonresidents when “the cause of action lies
160
in defamation or privacy.”
The Friday court stated that
“according to the plain terms of the statute, when an act is
committed outside Minnesota that causes injury inside the state,
and the cause of action asserted is defamation or privacy, there is
161
no personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” Thus,
the central issue in Friday was “whether, by sending ‘one or more’
allegedly defamatory e-mails to Minnesota recipients, Friday
162
committed an ‘act in Minnesota’ or an ‘act outside Minnesota.’”
The Friday court rejected Northwest’s claims that the operative
“act” for purposes of defamation occurs when the defamatory
163
information is received rather than when it is made or sent. Such a
construction would mean that, for purposes of the long-arm
statute, the defendant committed an “act” within the state, thus
removing her conduct from the defamation exception of the long164
arm statute. In addressing this point, the Friday court stated that:
The publication of a defamatory statement . . . does
indeed require two acts: the act of the alleged defamer in
making the statement, and the act of a third party in
understanding it. Given this fact, our decision in Wheeler
properly focuses on the act committed by the defendant—
making the allegedly defamatory statement—as the
operative act for purposes of determining jurisdiction
158. Id. at 592 (citing Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408
(Minn. 1992)).
159. Id. at 592-93 (citing M INN. STAT. § 543.19 (1998)).
160. Id.; see supra note 17.
161. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Paulucci v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1335, 1342 (D.
Minn. 1997) (stating that a defamation “case presents one of the statute’s
anomalies, and falls outside ‘most’ of the jurisdictional questions”)).
162. Id. (comparing M INN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1(c), with M INN. STAT. §
543.19, subd. 1(d)(3)).
163. Id. at 594.
164. See id.
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165

under the long-arm statute.
In arguing that Minnesota had jurisdiction over Friday,
Northwest urged the court to view contacts made via the Internet
and e-mail as qualitatively different from regular mail, telephone
166
calls, and faxes. This assertion was intertwined with the argument
that the operative “act” for purposes of defamation was the receipt
167
of the allegedly defamatory information.
However, the court
declined to adopt such a position stating:
Although Northwest argues that “the phenomenon and
power” of the Internet justifies a different result, it has
failed to demonstrate why that should be so in this case.
This case involves “one or more” individually sent and
received e-mails, which, as the district court cogently
observed, are “just electronic mail.” Northwest has
provided no reason why the fact that the letters in this
case were sent by e-mail should cause a different result
than if they were sent by traditional mail. The legislature
obviously did not have the Internet in mind when it
drafted the long-arm statute, and the legislature may well
wish to reconsider the statute in light of “the
phenomenon and power” of the Internet.
Such
considerations, however, are not relevant in this case, and
our decision is the result of a straightforward168application
of the long-arm statute and relevant caselaw.
As of October, 2002, Minnesota’s long-arm statute remains
169
unchanged from when the court decided Friday in 2000.
In its brief to the appeals court, Northwest also argued for the
170
application of the Calder effects test.
The Friday court
disregarded Calder entirely in making its decision, instead focusing
on “a straightforward application of the [Minnesota] long-arm
171
Thus, the unique procedural
statute and relevant caselaw.”
posture of Griffis cannot be disregarded when evaluating its
reasoning because, in Minnesota, claims of defamation and privacy
are subject to dismissal under the Minnesota long-arm statute. As
165. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 594-95.
167. See Brief of Appellant, at 11-12, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617
N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (No. C1-00-528).
168. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d 590, 594-95 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000).
169. See M INN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1 (2002).
170. See supra note 167, at 1, 16-17.
171. Northwest Airlines, 617 N.W.2d at 595.
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such, Griffis is limited to its specific facts and its unique procedural
posture.
D. Minnesota Cases Involving Issues of Personal Jurisdiction,
Intentional Torts, and Internet Contacts
At least two cases have been decided in Minnesota that did not
involve defamation and privacy claims in which Internet contacts
were argued to have created the requisite sufficient minimum
172
contacts. In Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, the court of appeals
considered the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction over an
Internet advertiser engaged in soliciting business for an on-line
173
gambling enterprise. The Internet advertiser provided a Nevada
174
telephone number for interested consumers to call.
The
Minnesota Attorney General sued the defendant advertiser for
deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud on
175
the Internet. In affirming the district court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, the court of appeals focused on the
commercial nature of the contacts made by the advertiser (which
included a finding that Minnesota Internet users had accessed the
advertiser’s website over 248 times in a two-week period) and
concluded that, for purposes of due process, the advertiser had
purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in
176
Minnesota. In so holding, the court stated that “[a]dvertising in
the forum state, or establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum state indicates a defendant’s
177
intent to serve the market in that state.”
The court wisely
cautioned, however, that it will “take some time to determine the
precise balance between the rights of those who use the Internet to
disseminate information and the powers of the jurisdictions in
which receiving computers are located to regulate for the general
178
welfare.”
The court applied established legal principles of
personal jurisdiction and limited its task to deciding the dispute
based on the particular facts of the case before it.
172. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d without comment by 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
173. See id. at 718.
174. Id. at 717.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 718-19.
177. Id. at 719.
178. Id. at 718.
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More recently, in the unpublished decision of M.G. Incentives,
179
Inc. v. Marchand, the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the
district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
180
whose contacts with the plaintiff included e-mail. In that case, a
Minnesota business incentives company sued a non-resident
company alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, conversion, and
181
fraud in connection with the sale of marketing tools.
In
exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant, however, the
court specifically rejected the argument that the defendant’s e-mail
182
contacts alone established personal jurisdiction. In so concluding,
the court stated as follows:
[I]s it not a nonresident’s contacts with the forum state,
and not with the forum state’s residents, that determines
whether minimal contacts exist? An email message is
directed to a specific person, or rather to a specific email
address, and that address is independent of the intended
recipient’s geographical location. Email stands virtually
alone in communications traffic, unfettered by any
specific geographical site. People often review their email
from locations other than where they principally conduct
business. To conclude that email contacts alone might
establish personal jurisdiction would potentially subject
the sender to jurisdiction in any state in which the
recipient reviews a message. We leave it to the supreme
court to determine whether email 183
correspondence alone
may establish personal jurisdiction.
The court went on to apply existing Minnesota authority and
principles of personal jurisdiction in evaluating the defendant’s
184
non-email contacts with the plaintiff. In finding the defendant’s
contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the court focused on
the selling behavior of the defendant, which included faxes, phone
185
calls, mailings, and an in-person visit to the plaintiff.
The contacts at issue in Griffis can be likened to the e-mail
contacts discussed, and rejected, in M.G. Incentives. Internet
postings, like e-mail, may be directed at a particular individual

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

2001 WL 96223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
M.G. Incentives, 2001 WL 96223, at *4.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
See id. at *2-*3.
Id. at *4.
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independent of an intended target or a recipient’s geographical
location. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Griffis
recognized this very concept in concluding that Luban’s postings to
186
the newsgroup could not provide the basis of jurisdiction. Like email, Internet postings are not restricted by specific geographical
sites. Like e-mail, postings to an Internet newsgroup may be
reviewed from locations other than where the senders or recipients
of the postings conduct business or reside. Similarly, jurisdiction
based on postings made to an Internet newsgroup could potentially
subject the sender to jurisdiction in any state in which the recipient
reviews the message. Given the existence of Minnesota authority
addressing relevant issues of personal jurisdiction and Internet
contacts, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adoption of the Third
Circuit’s three-part test for intentional torts was unwarranted.
V. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court
appears to have adopted a new test for personal jurisdiction
involving claims of intentional torts that would potentially displace
existing Minnesota authority. This new test is embodied in a case
that had nothing to do with underlying substantive Minnesota law.
Rather, the fundamental question in Griffis involved the
enforcement of a foreign court judgment applying Alabama law in
a Minnesota court. It is important to note that had the claims in
Griffis arisen under Minnesota law, Northwest Airlines v. Friday would
have been applied. Given its peculiar posture, Griffis provided an
unlikely vehicle for such a fundamental change in Minnesota’s
personal jurisdiction law.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Third Circuit’s test is in inherent conflict with its recognition—and
the Third Circuit’s recognition—that no special category of
personal jurisdiction analysis exists for intentional torts. This
internal inconsistency in the reasoning of Griffis produces a
practical problem for future litigants in that it fails to express
whether the new test actually displaces existing Minnesota personal
jurisdiction law and if so, under what conditions. Finally, when
considered carefully, the test adopted by Griffis, which focuses on
whether the defendant “expressly aimed the allegedly tortious
conduct at the forum such that the forum was the focal point of the
186.

Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn. 2002).
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tortious activity,” does not appear to differ greatly from the
“purposeful availment” criteria of long-standing personal
187
jurisdiction law. While such a focus may comprise an enhanced
criteria, a truly separate and distinct category of analysis seems to
be lacking, further exposing the flaws inherent in the Third
Circuit’s reasoning, as well as the Griffis court’s subsequent
188
adoption of the same.
Although the Third Circuit and the Griffis courts proclaimed
that the IMO Industries test controls the potential for the overly
broad application of Calder, their decisions have added a host of
complicated factors to an already imprecise process. Far from
expressing coherent views regarding Internet contacts and personal
jurisdiction, the confusion surrounding the test adopted by the
Griffis court will likely spawn years of litigation and require further
clarification, definition, and guidance regarding the proper
application of the test. As such, the Griffis decision evinces an
unnecessary muddying of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction waters.

187. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 2002 WL 31053211 (D. Minn. Sept. 4,
2002), at *5 (citing United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st
Cir. 2001)).
188. Id. (relying on Calder to bolster its exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the corporate defendant).
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